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If those who committed torture abroad come to the United States, they can be
prosecuted as torturers, or deported under human rights provisions of U.S.
immigration law. 2  But our ability to criminally punish extrajudicial killings-
often very closely linked to the crime of torture-is less. For example, if a state
official commits an extrajudicial killing by torturing and ultimately killing an
individual, and later comes into the jurisdiction of the United States, punishment
options are limited to those described above.3 Why is this?
There are a few reasons for the difficulty in bringing individuals that have
committed extrajudicial killings to justice. The biggest obstacle is that an
extrajudicial killing is not criminalized under international law in as broad a
manner as torture. Even though torture seems less severe than death, torture is an
action that is never excusable under international law. Yet states are permitted to
intentionally kill individuals in a number of circumstances. They may execute
them after due judicial process, they may incapacitate them in a valid exercise of
law enforcement, or they may target them pursuant to the laws of armed conflict.
Even the term "extrajudicial killing" does not perfectly reflect the situations in
which a state may kill-war and law enforcement operations are both extrajudicial,
yet killing is and should be permitted in both cases.
* Erin Creegan is a Trial Attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice, National Security
Division, Counterterrorism Section, and an Adjunct Professor the George Washington University Law
School and the University of Maryland, College Park. The opinions represented in this paper are those
of the author and do not express the positions of the United States Government in any way.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(a)-(b)(2) (2001).
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(iii) (2010) ("Inadmissible aliens"):
Any alien who, outside the United States, has committed, ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of -
(I) Any act of torture, as defined in section 2340 of title 18; or
(II) Under color of law of any foreign nation, any extrajudicial killing, as defined
in section 3(a) of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350
note), is inadmissible.
See also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (2010) ("Deportable aliens") (invoking the same descriptions from §
1182 to remove already admitted aliens).
3. For another example of an immigration prosecution, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) (2001)
("Whoever knowingly makes any false statement under oath, in any case, proceeding, or matter relating
to ... any law of the United States relating to naturalization, citizenship, or registry of aliens . . . shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years .... ).
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Nonetheless, even though intentional killing, unlike torture, can sometimes be
lawfully done, there exists a vast class of killings committed by public officials of
states that are done pursuant to or motivated by the same illiberal motives as
torture: to suppress dissent, to eliminate political rivals, and to frighten civilian
populations. These killings should be outlawed and prosecutors given the tools to
fight them.
The primary goal of this paper is to suggest the adoption of a statute that
criminalizes extrajudicial killing, one that may be based on an international
convention. To do so, this paper defines the crime of these killings carefully,
separating them from lawful exercises of force and distinguishing their illiberal
and vindictive nature. First, this paper begins by providing a brief background on
extrajudicial killings and torture, as well as the current failure of international
criminal law to criminalize extrajudicial killings sufficiently. Next, this article
analyzes a crime closely related to extrajudicial killing-the crime of torture-
nearly three decades after the entry into force of the seminal human rights crime
treaty, the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). This convention may provide the
model for a new international ban on killings. Finally, the article concludes with a
proposed U.S. law criminalizing extrajudicial killings, whether underpinned by an
international convention, or not.
Considering the differences between torture and extrajudicial killings, but
taking account of their many similarities, this article analyzes whether the structure
of the CAT can be adopted to suit the new, heretofore neglected, purpose of
criminalizing extrajudicial killings through the creation of a new convention. This
article determines whether the structure and provisions of CAT, successfully
widely adopted by the international community, can be adapted into a convention
for extrajudicial killing that has a strong likelihood both of being adopted by states,
and effectively suppressing these illiberal killings. In conclusion, this article
considers how to draft a domestic criminal law for the U.S., a statute that grants
both jurisdiction and the ability to allow prosecutors to charge these types of
criminals, whether or not a convention against extrajudicial is created.
II. THE STATUS Quo: THE CRIME OF TORTURE AND THE FACT OF KILLINGS
Both extrajudicial killing and torture had a place in the ancient world.
Towards the end of the 20th century, however, there emerged a consensus that
torture was not a legitimate tool of the state, and corresponding legal regimes
followed. However, such legal regimes have not emerged in regards to
extrajudicial killings. A brief history of these crimes is useful in determining
whether extrajudicial killing can be criminalized similarly in the future.
A. Criminalizing Torture
In the ancient world, torture was common. Practices ranged from stoning to
crucifixion to disgusting devices such as the "brazen bull" from Ancient Greece by
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which victims were burned and boiled to death while their screams were converted
4into music by a specially designed instrument. Torture lasted into the middle ages
of Europe. For example, one of the first times torture was used to suppress
political opinion took place during the Inquisition.5 Medieval trials were by
"ordeal"-rather than testing a conviction with evidence, defendants suffered
certain pain to prove their innocence, and torture was considered an effective, and
legitimate, means to elicit truth and confessions from defendants.6 Like so many
others of the ancient time, these barbarous practices had difficulty withstanding the
emergence of the modem era: the dawn of the Enlightenment,7 of democracy, and
of greater social justice and technological progress.8 Torture, as a common
practice, seemed to be going by the wayside.
Yet, strangely, some governments began to utilize torture as a tactic of
modern warfare. Twentieth century democracies, which by definition agree to be
bound to the rule of law and the importance of writing un-crossable lines for
governmental power, discovered a utility for torture. While democracies have
generally chosen not to go to war with each other,9 post-colonial wars and wars of
national liberation in the modem era created an uncertain role for the law of armed
conflict in intrastate conflicts.10 This uncertainty has allowed some democracies to
use torture, relying on facilities for detention and harm that their unconventional
enemies could not replicate."
France admitted to the use of torture in the Algerian War for the
independence of the French colony.' 2 Some of the commonly reported practices
included: sleep, food and water deprivation; exposure to extreme heat or cold;
electric shock; loud noise; forced maintenance of "stress" positions for long
periods of time; water torture; beatings; sexual abuse; humiliation and degradation;
4. JEAN KELLAWAY, THE HISTORY OF TORTURE AND EXECUTION 10-18 (Warren Lapworth ed.,
1st pbk. ed. 2000).
5. ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNAL, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
PENAL: LA PRtVENTION ET LA SUPPRESSION DE LA TORTURE 29 (1977) [hereinafter REVUE
INTERNATIONALE].
6. Id. at 26-27.
7. See generally MARCHESE BECCARIA, OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Edward D. Ingraham
trans., 1764) (consisting of the first modem work of criminology and criminal justice, and one that
strongly advocated torture as both barbarous and completely ineffective).
8. J. JEREMY WISNEWSKI, UNDERSTANDING TORTURE 24-25 (2010) (giving political,
humanistic, juridical, and socio-anthropological views on why torture went into disfavor at this time);
see also AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT ON TORTURE 29 (2nd ed. 1975) [hereinafter AMNESTY].
9. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
AFFAIRS 205,213 (1983).
10. Id. at 216.
11. WISNEWSKI, supra note 8, at 38.
12. GENERAL PAUL AUSSARESSES, SERVICES SPECIAUX, ALGtRIE 1955-1957 11-13 (2001); see
also THE BATILE OF ALGIERS (Rialto Pictures 1966) (a seminal film publicizing the use of torture in
Algeria).
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use of drugs; and, threats against relatives.' 3  Likewise, the republican
constitutional monarchy of the United Kingdom used torture-or at the very least,
"cruel and unusual treatment,"l 4 -in dealing with Irish separatists of the Irish
Republican Army. Tactics included: "hooding"; wall standing and stress positions;
sleep, food and water deprivation; and, constant loud and unpleasant noise.
The United Kingdom, like many colonial liberal societies, was especially
cruel abroad. The scale of violence used against colonized peoples may seem
more like crimes against humanity than isolated acts of torture that a statute
intends to prevent. However, tactics used by the United Kingdom against Kenyans
during the 1950s included: beatings; electric shock; use of cigarettes on the body;
skin searing; use of pliers on sensitive body parts; rape, including penetration with
foreign objects; and dragging people behind cars. Likewise, Spain did little to
reform its law enforcement and military apparatuses for dealing with terrorists
even as it emerged from the Franco dictatorship.17 As a result, members of the
Basque separatist terrorist group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ("ETA"), continued to be
tortured in the new democratic regime. For example, allegations against the ETA
during the 1980s and 1990s state that 84 percent of Basque activists in prison were
tortured, and large numbers of men in the Basque country were arrested and
tortured, but never charged with crimes. 8  In one case, members of a Basque
newspaper accused police forces of asphyxiating them with plastic bags, and of
forcing them to participate in a simulated execution.' 9
With even democracies finding a utility for torture, it can scarcely be
surprising that illiberal societies, dictatorships, fascist regimes, and communist
states have engaged in even more extreme measures in order to ensure control of
the people, or to force a great societal change based on ideology. 20  Whereas
democracies seem driven to use torture under the stress of separatists, terrorists, or
13. See DARIUS REJALi, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY (2009) (explaining different torture
techniques); see also JOHN T. PARRY, UNDERSTANDING TORTURE: LAW, VIOLENCE, AND POLITICAL
IDENTITY 99 (2010); REvUE INTERNATIONALE, supra note 5, at 59-60.
14. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. 59 (1978) (comparing acts rising
to torture and lesser intrusions on personal dignity that might constitute other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment).
15. Id. at 35 (explaining that these tactics were so prolific and controversial they came to be
known as the "five techniques").
16. PARRY, supra note 13, at 108.
17. Id. at 117.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 118.
20. Nazi Germany, an emblematic example of an illiberal dictatorship with cruel methods of
repression, used torture against its own citizens. Joseph Stalin, Soviet dictator in the years after the
Second World War, proved little better. Secret police with the power to torment ordinary citizens were
key elements of repression, emulated in many illiberal societies since, such as Iran. Pol Pot, a
Cambodian dictator who massacred thousands in "killing fields," and forced the entire country to
migrate from cities to rural areas, was famous for the use of pulling fingernails off, or driving shoots of
bamboo under fingernails, to compel persons to give information in an interrogation.
VOL. 41: 2188
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crumbling empires, dictatorships must ply violence constantly in order to maintain
control. Every day is a part of an ongoing, dire national security emergency.
In the later part of the 20th century, a clearer consensus emerged that torture
was not legitimate and that derogation from democratic principles in
emergencies-such as the famous "ticking time bomb" scenario-undermined the
rule of law. 21 It was also accepted that torture was not especially effective as it
produced false intelligence and false confessions. 22 Yet defining and criminalizing
torture internationally did not take place until decades after World War II, a period
of time when torture-like abuses were part of a decolonization strategy. An
inability to qualify and define the phenomena as a discrete legal concept was
certainly part of the problem.23 Many documents declared the broad belief that
"torture" should not be permitted, whatever the concept might mean.24
After a number of torture cases became public in the 1960s and 1970s in
Algeria, Latin America, and elsewhere, human rights groups launched campaigns
and begin to scrutinize the problem.25 At this time, there was a wave of new U.N.
General Assembly resolutions reaffirming these principles.26 Most significantly, in
1977 the General Assembly requested that the Commission on Human Rights draft
a binding convention against torture based on the General Assembly's 1975
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.27 In 1978, an
ongoing working group continued the drafting process.28 Between 1978 and 1984,
numerous drafts circulated and there was fierce debate that led to volumes of
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention on Human Rights art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter ECHR]; American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter ACHR].
22. AMNESTY, supra note 8, at 24; GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INT'L
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 449-53 (2010).
23. AMNESTY, supra note 8, at 33-38.
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A, art.
5 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man art. 26,
O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OAS/Ser.LJV/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003) [hereinafter Rights of Man]; ICCPR, supra note
21, art. 7; ECHR, supra note 21, art. 3; ACHR, supra note 21, art. 5. Some treaties are also non-
derogable. See e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 4; ECHR, supra note 21, art.15; ACHR, supra note 21,
art. 27.
25. MANFRED NOWAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A COMMENTARY 3 (2008).
26. G.A. Res. 3059 (XXVII), 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3059 (Nov. 2, 1973); G.A. Res. 3218
(XXIX), 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3218 (Nov. 6, 1974); G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3452 (Dec. 9, 1975); G.A. Res. 3453(XXX), 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ (Dec 9, 1975); G.A. Res.
31/8, 6, U.N. Doc. AIRES/31/8 (Dec 13, 1976).
27. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Convention against
Torture].
28. NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 25, at 3-4.
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drafting history. In 1984, the final version of the working group was approved by
the Commission on Human Rights and transmitted to the General Assembly, where
it received relatively speedy signature and ratification by a number of states.29
This treaty, the Convention against Torture ("CAT"), has become one of the most
important human rights treaties because it criminalizes illiberal assaults on the
human body and human dignity.
B. The Fact ofExtrajudicial Killings
Extrajudicial killings have been relatively common since the end of World
War II. However, they are not criminalized as broadly as torture despite their
similar history and prevalence. They are intertwined with the fate of people who
have been "disappeared" by their governments. For example, in Argentina,
liberals and communists who opposed the ruling military junta were executed or
simply "disappeared."0 From the 1970s to the 1990s, during Operation Condor ,
Chile and other countries with military rule also participated in systematized
extrajudicial killings.
Extrajudicial killings are scarcely in the past, and are ongoing in a number of
countries. One of the most widely reported modem cases of extrajudicial killing is
taking place in the Philippines currently. Human Rights Watch reports that,
despite the current president's campaign to end violence, there have been seven
recent extrajudicial killings and three recent forced disappearances. 32 Hundreds of
people, mostly political activists and journalists, have disappeared or been killed.
At least one human rights lawyer has suggested that the killings are widespread
enough to constitute a crime against humanity. 34 In a Congressional hearing on the
subject, Senator Barbara Boxer commented: "[flor too long the Government of the
Philippines has not taken sufficient action . . . to address extrajudicial killings and
bring those responsible to justice."35
29. Id. at 5.
30. Argentina Dirty War 1976-1983, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org
/military/world/war/argentina.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) (explaining, among other details, that the
disappeared were known as the "desaparecidos").
31. Robert Plummer, Condor Legacy Haunts South America, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/3720724.stm (last updated June 8, 2005).
32. Philippines: Extrajudicial Killings, Enforced Disappearances, and Impunity, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July 14, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/features/philippines-extrajudicial-killings-enforced-
disappearances-and-impunity.
33. Kate McGeown, Philippines Extrajudicial Killings Continue, Says HRW, BBC NEWS (July 19,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14196401.
34. PHL Police, Military May Face Extrajudicial Killing Raps Before ICC - Lawyer, GMA NEWS
(Sept. 29, 2011, 8:42 PM), http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/233810/news/nation/phl-police-
military-may-face-extrajudicial-killing-raps-before-icc-lawyer.
35. Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines: Strategies to End the Violence, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Relations of the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 2 (2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
1 10shrg408l I/pdflCHRG-1 10shrg4081 I.pdf
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In Ethiopia, the threat of separatists from the Ogaden National Liberation
Front ("ONLF") has increased reports of torture and extrajudicial killings.36
Estimates put between 1,000 and 2,000 civilians killed by members of the
Ethiopian police force or military.37  In the Ivory Coast, the United Nations
discovered mass graves in a center of opposition thinking in the country's business
capital.38 The U.N. documented at least twenty-six cases of extrajudicial killings,
as well as eighty-five known arbitrary arrests and eleven cases of rape by
government actors.39
In Bangladesh, Amnesty International has reported that the Rapid Action
Battalion ("RAB"), a special police force, has committed at least 700 extrajudicial
killings since the group's creation in 2004.40 Amnesty International reports that
the RAB falsely claims a number of these killings were in gun battles or accidents,
rather than intentional killings of civilians.4 1 There are powerful organized
criminal groups in the country; however, many of the killings do not appear to be
pursuant to law enforcement needs, but rather the actions of a force that has
impunity, and kills after aggressive questioning post-arrest. Torture victims of the
RAB have reported that they were told if they did not falsely confess, they would
be "cross-fired," or, in other words, killed by the police who would claim they had
done so pursuant to a gun battle.42
Showing even further that torture and extrajudicial killings are inextricably
related, death is often a part of torture. A state actor could kill, or threaten to kill,
third parties in order to coerce a person into talking. In fact, in many reports of
torture from victims across the world, the torture victim observed a killing, or a
killing was a part of the torture. Additionally, torture is often so intense that it
results in death, or death is contemplated as the inevitable yet perhaps not fully
sought out, consequence of severe physical torture. In fact, Amnesty International
found that from 1997 to 2000, there were at least eighty known deaths from torture
in addition to the fact that instances of torture were present in 150 countries and
widespread in seventy countries.43
A U.S. case shows that there are instances of killings that simply are not
addressed, leaving the torture statute as one of the only tools for suppressing
36. See Jason McLure, Ethiopia's Dirty War, THE DAILY BEAST (Jan. 21, 2008, 7:00 PM), http:
//www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/01/2 1/ethiopia-s-dirty-war.html.
37. Id.




40. AMNESTY INT'L, CRIMES UNSEEN: EXTRAJUDICIAL ExEcUTIoNS IN BANGLADESH 2 (Aug.




43. PARRY, supra note 13, at 16.
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illiberal behavior. In United States v. Belfast, the first CAT prosecution in the
U.S., refugees from Sierra Leone that sought refuge Liberia were interrogated by
Liberian soldiers and killed if they did not answer questions satisfactorily." As
one defendant shot some of the refugees, he told the others that they would be
next. 45 One soldier killed one of the refugees by slowly sawing off his head as he
begged for his life.46 Yet only the torturing of two refugees who survived the
encounter could be prosecuted in a U.S. court-the killings they witnessed were
not and could not be prosecuted.47
These figures demonstrated the pervasiveness of extrajudicial killings in the
modem world. While murders by government officials are prosecuted zealously in
countries with a high adherence to the rule of law, such as the United States, other
countries often commit extrajudicial killings with impunity. The need to eliminate
safe havens and make a definitive statement that illiberal killings are just as wrong
as illiberal assaults on the body shows why a convention on the prohibition on
extrajudicial killing is needed at this time. It also shows why the United States
should adopt a statute-perhaps based on such a treaty, but even without one-that
can punish those killers who come within the jurisdiction of the United States.
C. The Incomplete Law ofKilling
There can be no doubt that in various parts of the world, governments have
killed and "disappeared" their own people to maintain power and squelch dissent.
In some instances, they are prosecuted under currently defined international law
paradigms of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and enforced disappearances.
However, an examination of each crime's framework demonstrates that they are
defined too narrowly to provide a sufficient liability framework for extrajudicial
killings, and as a result, a convention specific to extrajudicial killings should be
adopted.
1. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
While international criminal liability is not comprehensive in terms of
covering all forms of large-scale illiberal killings, there are two well-defined
international criminal law paradigms that could provide liability for extrajudicial
killing-war crimes and crimes against humanity. War crimes proscribe certain
kinds of conduct, including summary execution of civilians or combatants, as
illegal when they occur pursuant to the law of armed conflict. 48 Crimes against
44. U.S. v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 794 (1Ith Cir. 2010).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 795.
47. See id. at 799-800.
48. Dating back to the 15th century, war crimes have been tried and punished longer than any
other international crime. See SoLIs, supra note 22, at 28. Currently the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 give the most definitive account of the commonly accepted war crimes. See Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva
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humanity proscribe certain kinds of conduct, including murder, as illegal when
done as part of a widespread attack on a civilian population. 49 However, these
paradigms are too narrow to encompass all contexts in which extrajudicial killings
may take place.
The idea of international criminal liability, including war crimes and crimes
against humanity, stems from the notion that the state may be unable or unwilling
to dispense justice. This idea dates back to the Second World War and,
specifically, to the crimes of the Nazis who perpetrated genocide on behalf of the
state, as well as other crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression. Thus, when the state is the perpetrator of crimes-such as is the case
with extrajudicial killings-criminal liability can no longer be prosecuted by the
state.
While states cannot be held directly liable for criminal activity, the
germination of international criminal law begins with the idea that the state can do
wrong.5  There are some actions, taken by a state or its agents, which should be-
and can be-sanctioned regardless of the laws and policies of that state. Long
before Nuremberg, war crimes were punishable international crimes. 52 Wars have
been a long-recorded feature of human existence and generally, war results in the
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 87 [hereinafter Second Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 130, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. War crimes along a similar formulation are also
proscribed in Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 8, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into
force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Statute of the ICC].
49. The proposition that crimes against humanity fall within the scope of international law dates
back to the famous "Martens Clause" of the 1899 Hague Conventions with the statement:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted
by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public
conscience.
Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1803, available at http://www.icrc.org/ibl.nsfTFULJL150?OpenDocument. Crimes against
humanity were then criminally proscribed for the Nuremberg trials by Control Council Law No. 10.
Allied Control Council, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and
Against Humanity, Law No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1945), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtl0.asp
[hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10]. They now are also proscribed in Article 7 of the Statute of
the International Criminal Court. Statute of the ICC, supra note 48, art. 7.
50. See Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 49.
51. States themselves cannot have direct criminal liability. See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d
Sess., April 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
43-51 (2001).
52. See SOLIS, supra note 22, at 28.
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incapacitation of one state's government while the victor occupies it. Thus, those
who have broken the international customs of fair play in wartime were subject to
tribunals run by the victor.
Historically, there has also been international criminal liability for
"peremptory norms," or actions deemed so wrong by all the international
community that they are universally punishable as crimes.5 3 Usually these crimes
have some nexus to international concerns, such as the fact that they commonly
occur across international borders or on the high seas. Paradigmatic examples
include piracy and slave trading, which both occurred on the high seas and relied
on international cooperation to ensure the existence of no safe havens for such
criminals.54
The current international criminal law paradigms of war crimes and crimes
against humanity are not sufficient to criminalize extrajudicial killings. Both
paradigms prevent state actors from killing their people, but do not do so broadly
enough. Under the war crimes doctrine, civilians are protected as improper objects
of attack." This holds true in cases of a civil war or a war of national liberation.
Thus, when a state is engaged in an internal armed conflict, its power to kill its
citizens might be circumscribed.17  This means that extrajudicial killings can be
53. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67-68 (1996).
54. See id.
55. This is called either "noncombatant immunity," or the "principle of distinction." See SOLIS,
supra note 22, at 251.
56. See Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that wars of national liberation are considered international for
the purposes of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions regime).
57. There are two conflicting veins in international law on this point. On the one hand, internal
armed conflicts were not historically treated like international armed conflicts. See Rogier Bartels,
Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical Evolution of the Legal Divide Between
International and Non-international Armed Conflicts, 91 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROss 35, 45 (2009).
In the past, states were seen as having plenary power within their borders. See id. at 46. Thus internal
killings of traitors or freedom fighters or those with political differences of opinion might be not be
illegal, if purely interstate. See id. Under this model the prohibition on war crimes is not so much a
human rights idea, but an idea about interstate relations. This certainly fits with the relatively early
historical emergence of criminalization of war crimes, far predating other crimes that do have a nexus to
human rights ideas. Nonetheless, even in earlier periods before the emergence of the human rights
movement, and during this era of high sovereignty, there was the idea of belligerency-the notion that
once a rebellion reached a certain level of strength, the conflict had become "international" in the idea
of reciprocal rights between the two entities. Id. at 50-51. The laws of warfare would apply. Id. In
modem times, there is increasing strength to the notion that internal wars be governed by the same law
of armed conflict as international conflicts. Factually, internal conflicts are now much more common,
and humanitarian concerns are the same in internal conflicts as in international ones. Id. at 40. Legally,
the Geneva Conventions established a very minimum baseline for internal armed conflicts in the form
of common article 3, expanded by Additional Protocol II. Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610; First Geneva
Convention, supra note 48, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 3; Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 48, art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 3. Many also contend
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prosecuted as a war crime, but only if committed in an armed conflict setting.
Murder is both prohibited in Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions-the
minimum baseline of prohibitions for armed conflict-as well as in the Third
Geneva Convention, with regard to prisoners of war, and in the Fourth Geneva
Convention, with regard to civilians.58  It is a crime under the Geneva
Conventions, as "grave breaches" that all parties must agree to prosecute or
extradite to another country that will prosecute. The same protections yet again
appear in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which expands the
1949 Geneva Conventions regime with new humanitarian protections.59
More narrowly, crimes against humanity may occur only in the context of
widespread attacks on the civilian population. This is a proscribed criminal
definition that has appeared in the charters of international criminal tribunals from
Nuremberg to the present International Criminal Court, but which, unlike other
international crimes, does not have a general treaty that states can sign onto and
agree to criminalize in their domestic law.60 As a result, many countries, including
the United States, lack crimes against humanity criminal statutes, while many have
war crimes statutes based on the Geneva Conventions, a genocide statute based on
the Genocide Convention, and so on.
The crimes against humanity offense is a reasonable way to proscribe states
from killing their own citizens. However, crimes against humanity are useful as a
legal tool only in a narrow setting: when a "widespread" attack on the civilian
population is in progress.62 This requirement is one that only gets the international
that customary international law places increasingly strong demands on states (and non-state actors) in
conforming their internal war behavior to the requirements of the international law of armed conflict.
See, e.g., SOLIS, supra note 22, at 169.
58. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 48,
art. 3.
59. Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Session Two: The U.S.
Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, Remarks at The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law
Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the
1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
419, 423-29 (1987).
60. Both war crimes and genocide are crimes for which there are treaties defining the crime and
requiring implementation in the states parties' domestic criminal law. Compare First Geneva
Convention, supra note 48, art. 50, Second Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 51, Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 48, art. 130, Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 147, and
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 5, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (identifying their respective grave breaches), with Genocide Implementation Act of 1987,
18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006), and War Crimes Act of 1996 § 2401, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(1996) (implementing
them in U.S. law).
61. See id.
62. Compare Statute of the ICC, supra note 48, art. 7 ("For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime
against humanity' means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack .... ), with
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 5, U.N.
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community involved when governments killing their people, and when the scale is
so grave that the massacre has risen to the level of international concern. This
seems to be a compromise intended to keep the international community out of a
state's affairs when the scale of violence is sufficiently small such that the state
may be capable of suppressing it, even if the state does not. On the other hand, a
widespread attack on the civilian population in a state suggests a massive
breakdown in the state's administration of justice, one of its central functions, and
thus, suggests why a mechanism for prosecution of such crimes by the
international community would be needed.
Consequently, while both the proscription on war crimes and the proscription
on crimes against humanity provide individual criminal liability for singular
persons who participate in wide-scale violence, neither catches the kind of
behavior that is criminalized in the Convention Against Torture: single, illiberal
wrongs by actors in a position of state authority. Neither crime penalizes torture
committed by a single member of a secret police force who interrogates a
suspected terrorist or separatist by administering a severe beating. Nor does either
crime punish extrajudicial killing by a soldier who takes a number of political
activists from their home in the night, kills them, and buries them as a means of
silencing them. The international community may want to limit the "small scale"
crimes that it takes an interest in, but extrajudicial killings should be one of the acts
for which direct international criminal liability is imposed, even in a single
instance. For example, torture, as criminalized by the CAT, demonstrates how
such a crime may be prosecuted outside of the realm of crimes against humanity or
war crimes. Torture can be a crime against humanity when a number of tortures
are committed on a wide scale, but unlike war crimes or crimes against humanity,6 3
it can also exist in a single instance under the CAT. Without such a treaty for
extrajudicial killings, the breakdown in the state's ability to dispense justice is
great. The state's very own representative has stolen away a person's right to live
with impunity, and perhaps, at the very encouragement of an illiberal government.
2. Enforced Disappearances
Torture and enforced disappearances are both acts that can, along with
murder, be visited widespread on a civilian population and thus, can be crimes
against humanity. However, unlike extrajudicial killings, both crimes are
criminalized through adoption of conventions. A discussion of the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (demonstrating that as it was the first international court since
Nuremberg, this Statute does not require the widespread quality-it instead requires that the list of acts
be done to civilians in an armed conflict setting), and Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (demonstrating that similar to the
Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, there is reference to the widespread requirement instead
of the armed conflict requirement-which seems to be the preferred prerequisite-and showing that this
issue is now more settled in favor of the definition that was adopted in the Rome Statute).
63. Statute of the ICC, supra note 48, art. 7(f).
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("CAED"),M in many ways similar to the CAT, will also inform the proposed
creation of a convention prohibiting extrajudicial killings.
To begin, an "enforced disappearance" is different from murder-while both
murder and enforced disappearances are listed in the statute of the International
Criminal Court, they are listed as distinct attacks on the civilian population that can
rise to the level of crimes against humanity. Furthermore, enforced disappearances
may be described as a crime of the same ilk as torture and extrajudicial killings,
particularly as outlined in the recent Convention against Enforced Disappearances.
The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance ("CAED") is a U.N.-sponsored international human rights treaty
whose object is to prohibit enforced disappearances.65  An "enforced
disappearance" is a term of art in international law; specifically, it is one of the
prohibited acts that, as part of a wide-scale attack against a civilian population,
constitutes a crime against humanity.66  The convention began with a 1978
resolution by the U.N. General Assembly condemning secret abductions and
disappearances by government and seeking further review of the problem.67 In
1992, years after the passage of the Convention against Torture, the General
Assembly returned with a resolution, the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Following this, in 2001, the Commission
on Human Rights established an open-ended working group to draft a treaty
against enforced disappearances. 69 The text drew very heavily from the model of
the CAT. The final text was adopted by the General Assembly in December 2006,
opened for signature in February 2007, and entered into force December of 2010.70
Although about ninety states have signed the treaty, only about thirty have ratified
it so far.7 Notably, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany,
and the Netherlands did not sign.72
An "enforced disappearance" is defined in Article 2 of the convention as:
the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by
64. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2006/1 (Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Convention on Enforced
Disappearance].
65. Id. pmbl.
66. Statute of the ICC, supra note 48, art. 7(i).
67. G.A. Res. 33/173,14, U.N. Doc. AIRES/33/173 (Dec. 20, 1978).
68. G.A. Res. 47/133, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992).
69. Human Rights Commission Res. 2001/46, Rep. to the Economic and Social Council on the
Fifty-Seventh Session of the Commission, 57th Sess., April 25, 2001, E/CN.4/2001/L.1 1/Add.5, at 36
(April. 25, 2001).
70. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES, http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src-treaty&mtdsg no-
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a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law.7
States who accede to the convention have the obligation to: investigate acts of
enforced disappearance and bring those responsible to justice; ensure that enforced
disappearance constitutes an offense under its criminal law; establish jurisdiction
over the offense of enforced disappearance when the alleged offender is within its
territory, even if they are not a citizen or resident; cooperate with other states in
ensuring that offenders are prosecuted or extradited, and assist the victims of
enforced disappearance, or locate and return their remains; respect minimum legal
standards around the deprivation of liberty, including the right for imprisonment to
be challenged before the courts; establish a register of those currently imprisoned,
and allow it to be inspected by relatives and counsel; and, ensure that victims of
enforced disappearance, or those directly affected by it, have a right to obtain
reparation and compensation. Like the CAT, the Convention intends to be
governed by a "Committee against Enforced Disappearances" of persons elected
by the member states-parties.
The Convention Against Enforced Disappearances obviously provides a
model for the path, which is proposed here: to use familiar structures from the
CAT regime to fight a related illiberal harm. But the existence of the new
Convention Against Enforced Disappearances does not preempt the need for a
Convention Against Extrajudicial Killings. Importantly, the enforced
disappearances treaty does not target murders specifically. In fact, it is not even so
expansive as to cover all sorts of illiberal deprivations of liberty by governmental
actors. The Convention addresses a singular tactic wherein thousands of persons
were "disappeared" by the government that was first made very famous by the
Nazi "Night and Fog" decree, or the Argentine "Dirty War." While government
actors continue to use this illiberal tactic, it seems the convention could have been
strengthened if it had been made to include a larger class of governmental
abductions and detentions, as the torture regime attempts to cover a large class of
illiberal government assaults.
Both the enforced disappearances treaty, and the treaty on extrajudicial
killings that this article proposes, seek to expand protection from illiberal
governmental assaults on the body (torture) to other illiberal acts (kidnapping, and
killing, respectively). But both the enforced disappearances treaty and the
proposed one suffer in that deprivations of liberty and life by the government can
be part of the regular and proper functioning of the state, while the imposition of
pain on the body is generally not. The way the enforced disappearances treaty
adapted to this problem was to circumscribe the kind of illiberal kidnapping the
drafters were concerned with down to the single tactic of "enforced
disappearances." But, what about openly jailing dissidents for political crimes?
73. Convention on Enforced Disappearance, supra note 64, art. 2.
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What happens when a government tells the family of a disappeared person that that
person has been imprisoned or killed? Do these actions somehow obviate the
crime of the illiberal abduction? This scarcely seems to make sense simply
because "disappearance" is the more common recent and historical mode of
illiberal governmental abduction and detention.
Related to the questions the narrow scope of the enforced disappearances
treaty is its usefulness. As it includes only one tactic for illiberal deprivation of
liberty, states may simply innovate others. The Dirty War in Argentina, Operation
Condor, and other historically known incidents of widespread disappearances have
already come and gone. However, despite the historical condemnation the tactic
has already received, similar crimes continue as governments become innovative
with their tactics to make such types of disappearances less obvious. Perhaps these
examples weighed heavily on the minds of the crime's innovators, who first turned
attention to the problem in 1978, but not again for fourteen years, and then not
again for nine years. From the first call for some proscription in this area until the
actual time the treaty went into force was a period of more than thirty years.
Perhaps the concept of illiberal abductions needs further normative work; this must
be addressed elsewhere.
Despite the future need for development of the concept of illiberal abductions,
the Convention Against Enforced Disappearances does inform any potential
Convention Against Extrajudicial Killings: the objective in proscribing illiberal
killings must be as comprehensive as possible. Unlike in the CAED, the crime
enumerated in the extrajudicial killing convention must not be limited merely to
the most known, common tactics. It must be defined carefully not to impinge on
the rightful prerogatives and powers of the state, as the CAT and the CAED are,
but it must also be written expansively, and not in a tactic-specific way.
Thus, as we have seen from studying the history above, the CAT was a
normatively powerful tool that crystallized a certain method as to how to prevent
governmental abuses of the person. Using the torture regime as a starting point, a
similar convention prohibiting extrajudicial killings could be successful if the
crime is more clearly defined. Patterning the treaty after the CAT worked for the
ratification of the CAED. However, in order to have a more widely ratified and
more useful treaty than the CAED, we cannot copy the CAT wholesale or narrow
the definition of an extrajudicial killing so much that it is not flexible, adaptable,
and useful. In order to have hope of adoption, the new crime of extrajudicial
killing outlined in the treaty must also not threaten the proper powers of
government, not only because of problems in the application, but also to prevent
perceived threats to governmental power. The next section will describe the type
of provisions that could be included in a draft Convention Against Extrajudicial
Killings modeled after the CAT.
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III. THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND How IT
CAN BE ADAPTED TO ExTRAuDIcIAL KILLING
The Convention Against Torture ("CAT") provides a strong legal framework
to inform the creation of a Convention Against Extrajudicial Killings as many
aspects of the crime of torture are similar to extrajudicial killing. CAT's articles
and objectives are used below as a baseline for suggesting the types of legal
provisions needed to prosecute extrajudicial killings.
A. The Definition of Torture
To begin, the definition of torture as outlined in Article 1 of the CAT is:
For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.
The main elements of the definition of torture are the involvement of a public
official, the infliction of severe pain and suffering, intent, and a specific purpose.74
While the actus reus for a new crime of extrajudicial murder will of course be
different, the intent element is analogous and thus, the proposed convention can
include a similar type of definition. For example, extrajudicial killing would
include intentionally causing the death of the victim rather than intentionally
inflicting severe pain or suffering.
The requirement of a public official should remain the same. This is the
defining characteristic of the crime of extrajudicial killing, and what separates it
from ordinary, privately committed murder for which international concern should
arguably not exist. However, the growth from before 1984 to present of non-state
actors in the international system may give some cause to expand the definition, at
least to cover non-state organizations that have defacto control over a territory or a
population. It perhaps should also be expanded to terrorist groups and any other
group with a political motive, although defining the law thusly may present some
conceptual challenges.
For example, when the CAT was negotiated, some parties advocated a
definition that would include public and private actors. 75 It does not seem that
74. NowAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 25, at 28.
75. AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
ENFORCEMENT 23-28 (1999).
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much thought was given to a middle way between including all actors: public and
private, and public officials only. 76 What of those acting "under color of law"?
What of contractors and private security forces? Or, organizations that exercise de
facto control over territory, but have yet to be recognized as a government? The
new convention on extrajudicial killings should address such concerns. This
article's particular recommendation is to include officials acting under "color of
law," and those with actual authority in a territory, regardless of whether they are
"public officials." This is based on the fact that non-state actors with the power to
act for the state acting illiberally also demonstrate the breakdown of the state.
Therefore, international criminal liability is reasonable.
Despite the similar role of the state in the crime of extrajudicial killing as in
torture, the specific purpose is likely to be different. The CAT notes that torture is
utilized often to gain information, to punish, and to intimidate, and lists these
motives as non-exclusive signs that a treatment is torture. Killing might be done
for the second and third purpose, but not the first. A rewriting of Article 1 for
extrajudicial killing purposes would note how extrajudicial killing is done to
punish dissidents, to quell political rivals, and for other illiberal purposes, as part
of a similar, non-exhaustive list. The non-exhaustive nature of the list should be
maintained to maximize the utility of the statute when extrajudicial killings are
utilized differently in the future, but with the same purpose to further illiberal
political motives.
One issue that was not fully defined in the torture regime, which becomes
even more important in a convention against extrajudicial killings, is the concept
of what constitutes a "lawful sanction."7 Thus, the convention may benefit from
an article that clearly defines the constitution of judicial authority. For example,
this could include the famous provisions of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions, Article 75, which lays out judicial authority plainly, and has been
accepted by many states already. This is similar to the approach of the definition
in the Torture Victim Protection Act in U.S. law, which defined an extrajudicial
killing not incident to lawful sanction for civil suit purposes.
B. Obligation to Prevent Torture
The obligation to prevent torture found in Article 2 of the CAT is as follows:
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction.
76. Id. (offering some suggestion to that effect from Germany regarding persons with powers of
public officials even if not official).
77. Id. at 28-35.
78. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) [hereinafter ATCA]. Congress subsequently
defined "extrajudicial killing" in the notes of this Act by approving section 3(a) of the Torture Victim
Protection Act. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
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2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat or war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be
invoked as a justification of torture.
Immediately, there is a clear need to distinguish torture and extrajudicial killings.
While there is no legitimate role for intentionally committed torture in warfare,
there is a role for public officials to kill others intentionally. This article must
clarify that it does not intend to impinge upon the scope of the law of armed
conflict, a vast and ever-changing body of law that determines when an individual
may be targeted, and what scope of harm may come to her on the battlefield.
However, war and exceptional circumstances should not be invoked as excuses to
allow murders and the persecution of enemies outside of the conflict. As a result,
this article must be phrased carefully to prohibit murders pre-texted on war while
also protecting evolutions in the law of armed conflict. Therefore, the article
should state that it does not apply to killings where the law of armed conflict is in
operation, but that the mere existence of a war or other exceptional conflict cannot
be invoked to justify extrajudicial killings that are not pursuant to the state's war
rights and power. It is important to avoid mention of prohibiting killings "beyond
the battlefield" because our technology, and the organization of enemies, are often
changing. Further, the notion of a bounded geographic zone of conflict could
become obsolete-it may already be obsolete enough in the U.S.'s vision of the
war on terror, whether the position of the U.S. is founded or not-to discourage the
U.S. and others from signing the law.
As stated above, this draft Convention should attempt to include actors who
operate under "color of law" or the authority of a non-state organization that has de
facto control over a territory. As in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions, non-state actors cannot invoke superior orders as a defense, treating
them just as we would any other fighting force. Nor should they be able to invoke
any defense of exceptional circumstances or public authority, just as state actors
are bound. But moreover, for these actors there is also the concern that a duress
defense could be used. For a public official to claim that they were forced to do
the action by their organization should not be a complete excuse, particularly if the
dangerousness or the conduct of the organization is known at the time the person
joins, they voluntarily join, or they have opportunities to safely leave the group
before or after committing the killing.
Generally, duress is not a defense in an intentional killing under current U.S.
law, but this point may be worth clarifying. For example, in a case from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic, a soldier argued he was forced under threat of death himself to kill
others.79 While a majority of the Appeals Chamber rejected this as a possible
79. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment on Appeal, I 11 (Oct. 7, 1997).
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defense, a minority was sympathetic to it. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court
has recently held that persecutors cannot be denied asylum under the "persecutor
bar"80 because they participated in acts of persecution under duress.81 A similar
type of clarification regarding these defenses should be included in the draft
convention.
C. Non-Refoulement
Article 3(1) of the CAT provides, as to non-refoulemont: "No State Party
shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture." It might seem at first glance that the need for a non-refoulement
provision in a Convention Against Extrajudicial Killings would not be as important
as such an article found in the CAT. One of the goals of torture in illiberal systems
is to gather information. If an infamous criminal has been extradited to an illiberal
state, there may be much the government wants to know about that criminal's other
crimes, associates, or anything else that might endanger or embarrass the state. If
the crime is a political one, like terrorism, the state may particularly want to gather
information, intimidate enemies, and prevent appearances of strong internal
dissension by torturing prisoners.
However, how should killing a prisoner that has just been received from an
extradition be treated? If it is incident to lawful sanction-for example, a
procedurally fair death penalty-then the convention's prohibitions should not be
implicated. But what if the state simply executes the person once they have them
in custody? It might seem as though this would not happen since a hasty illiberal
execution of an extradited person would draw a strong diplomatic response from
the sending state (whereas with torture, the fact of the torture might be unknown or
disputed). Therefore, it seems an extrajudicial killing would not likely occur or
need as much protection. However, it is certainly the case that states have been
concerned about the mistreatment of extraditees and expellees, or their
disappearance after being handed over from one state to another.82
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (2012).
81. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514 (2009).
82. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57619 (finding that a person could not be extradited if
they risk mistreatment in the receiving state); Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58004 (finding that a Sikh
separatist could not be deported because Indian guarantees of proper treatment were insufficient);
Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, App. No. 36378/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), http://hudoc.ec
hr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -68790 (finding that a Chechen rebel and terrorist could not
be deported to Russia); Baysakov and Others v. Ukraine, App. No. 54131/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages /search.aspx?i=001-97437 (finding that Kazakh opposition
activists could not be deported to their home country since the assurances of proper treatment given by
Kazakh authorities were unreliable and Kazakhstan lacks an effective torture prevention regime); see
generally EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FACTSHEET-EXPULSIONS AND EXTRADITIONS (2013),
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/211 A6F9C-A4EC-4CF7-AB2E-42E9D49FB2EF/O/FICHESEx
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The rule of non-refoulement is not directly related to the criminal enforcement
of an international legal norm against torture. Rather, it is a proactive provision
that prevents countries from being complicit in the torture that other states might
potentially do. It is speculative, and covers a narrow range of the possible
circumstances that might bring a victim into the hands of his or her torturer.
Furthermore, while a non-refoulement provision seems necessary, it is not without
problems. For example, despite U.S. President Obama's work to close down the
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a number of still-dangerous prisoners
cannot be repatriated to their country of origin due to a history of torture in those
regimes. Perversely, torturers who claim asylum in the U.S. could potentially use
the fact that they tortured in the past to show that they should not be repatriated to
a country where they used to be a government actor.
Given the difficulties in squaring the non-refoulement provision with the
needs of a torture or extrajudicial killing convention, could it be excluded perhaps
in favor of a more voluntary provision? Could this requirement explicitly be
waived in cases where the receiving state vows to the sending state that it will not
execute the person? Would this requirement genuinely protect extraditees or
expellees from the most likely kind of killing, one that is pursuant to a hasty trial
under corrupt judges, rather than a clearer extrajudicial killing? Recall that unlike
torture, states may sometimes kill individuals as a part of their function, and that
this makes clear legal provisions more difficult. Further, states already have
agreements not to seek the death penalty as a predicate of some extraditions, and
thus, this is not a likely solution to the problem. 4
Therefore, this paper suggests a more lax wording of the non-refoulement
provision, such as:
All States shall endeavor not to expel, return, or extradite a person to
another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to an extrajudicial killing, or a
lawfully sanctioned killing, by government that is not done pursuant to a
fair and impartial judicial process.
This wording can assist by expanding the sphere of concern beyond what is
criminalized, but giving states some flexibility to fashion new solutions. Unlike
torture, a killing is an easier breach to observe and thus, enforcement of the
provision would be easier than with torture, which could allow a less absolute
standard.
pulsions et extraditionsEN.pdf (providing examples and summaries of cases involving expulsions and
extraditions).
83. KATE JASTRAM & MARILYN ACHIRON, UNITED NATIONs HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES,
REFUGEE PROTECTION: A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 18 (2001), http://www.ipu.org/pdf/
publications/refugee en.pdf.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.) (explaining that Canada could not
extradite persons to places where they might be subject to the death penalty).
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History demonstrates that non-refoulement provisions are important and
necessary, and have as much of a role with killings as with torture. The suggested
changes to the provision in the draft convention in no way seek to expose
extraditees or expellees to an unnecessary risk of extrajudicial execution. If it was
found to do so, it may be that an absolute provision on non-refoulement-as in the
CAT-is the most suitable provision for the Convention Against Extrajudicial
Killings.
D. Obligation to Criminalize Torture
The obligation to criminalize torture, as laid out in Article 4 of the CAT, is as
follows:
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under
its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture
and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation
in torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account their grave nature.
This relatively noncontroversial provision is helpful-having criminal provisions
in each state is what will forge the identity of the crime of extrajudicial killing,
which is now only a vague concept. This type of provision should be included in a
draft extrajudicial killing convention.
E. Jurisdiction
Article 5 of the CAT outlines jurisdiction.
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the
following cases:
1. When the offences are committed in any territory under its
jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
2. When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
3. When the victim was a national of that State if that State
considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where
the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and
it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States
mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised
in accordance with internal law.
This article works in conjunction with Article 7 of the Convention.
1. The State Party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged
to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found, shall in
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the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in
the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that
State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of
evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less
stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to in article 5,
paragraph 1.
3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection
with any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair
treatment at all stages of the proceedings.
This language illustrates that the CAT is an aut dedere aut judicare treaty-or, an
"extradite or prosecute" treaty. There are an increasing number of treaties in the
international system that utilizes this sort of language. In international law
generally, there are traditional bases under which states can exercise criminal
jurisdiction-acts which occur in some part in their territory (objective territorial);
acts which produce effects in their territory (subjective territorial); acts which are
done by their nationals (nationality); acts which affect their nationals (passive
personality); acts which impinge vital national interests (protective); and, acts
which are of such a concern to the entire international community that it is in the
interests of all states to try and suppress them no matter where they occur
(universal). Aut dedere aut judicare treaties create a kind of agreed universal
jurisdiction, giving any state that has custody of an offender the right to try him or
her. Oddly, these agreements are widely construed to give jurisdiction over
offenders of nationalities of nonparties, and for crimes that occurred in nonparties'
territories.
The new convention against extrajudicial killings should continue to utilize
aut dedere aut judicare language like that of the CAT and numerous other
successful criminal "suppression" conventions. Yet, this may be problematic for
the United States. Although the language of the CAT mandates extending
jurisdiction over every state parties' territory, the United States explicitly declined
territorial jurisdiction in fashioning its domestic law. The U.S. criminal torture
statute explicitly only applies to cases of torture that occur outside the U.S. The
U.S. likely will want any new extrajudicial killings statute to be only applicable
outside of U.S. territory as well. The view may be that the United States already
has excellent rule of law and effectively suppresses illiberal assaults by U.S. public
officials. At the federal level, there is a "Public Integrity Section" at the
Department of Justice whose sole function is to root out cases of corruption; some
states have similar laws. Furthermore, torture cases inside the U.S. are uncommon.
Yet abroad and outside of normal law enforcement role and oversight, the U.S. has
opened its nationals up to criminal liability. Although other states may complain,
the U.S. may want to ratify a convention that includes this same language from the
CAT about territorial, nationality, and custodial universal jurisdiction, but not
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implement territorial jurisdiction. As a result, the provision on jurisdiction
included in the draft convention must be clearly thought-out and accepted.
F. Monitoring Committee
Significantly, Article 17(1) of the CAT provides a provision on monitoring.
There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter
referred to as the Committee) which shall carry out the functions
hereinafter provided. The Committee shall consist of 10 experts of high
moral standing and recognized competence in the field of human rights,
who shall serve in their personal capacity. The experts shall be elected
by the States Parties, consideration being given to equitable
geographical distribution and to the usefulness of the participation of
some persons having legal experience.
It is expanded at Article 19(1):
The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, reports on the measures they have taken
to give effect to their undertakings under this Convention, within one
year after the entry into force of this Convention for the State Party
concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit supplementary
reports every four years on any new measures taken, and such other
reports as the Committee may request.
And further expanded at Article 20(1):
If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to it to
contain well-founded indications that torture is being systematically
practiced in the territory of a State Party, the Committee shall invite that
State Party to co-operate in the examination of the information and to
this end to submit observations with regard to the information
concerned.
When the CAT was negotiated, it was decided to have its enforcement monitored
by a new Committee Against Torture as opposed to the existing Commission on
Human Rights. Very few suppressing Conventions have such a monitoring
mechanism. Usually, these kinds of committees exist for human rights treaties, the
predominant enforcement mechanisms of which are not criminal.85 Because any
Convention Against Extrajudicial Killings would, like the CAT, be similar to a
human rights convention-made to bind and monitor states as well as catch
criminal-it may be appropriate for it to be subject to some kind of monitoring
mechanism.
Unfortunately, reception for the Committee Against Torture has not been
exceptionally positive. A prevailing criticism has been that it is simply too weak
85. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Bodies, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/ HumanRightsBodies.aspx (last visited
Nov. 8,2012).
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to achieve its goals,86 and merely repeats the failed monitoring structures of other
regimes, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." This
has not been an incurable criticism; some have noted that stronger monitoring
regimes appear to be more successful, such as the one proposed in the optional
protocol to the CAT,88 or the European monitoring regime. Thus, it does not seem
that the version in the CAT should be adopted as written. There are also those that
argue that the Committee Against Torture does not go far enough, and that the
European model and its follower Optional Protocol ("OPCAT"), including its
much greater monitoring requirements, is more effective.89 While not wishing to
foreclose discussion on this issue and a finding by the international community that
such a system would be beneficial, this paper proposes to use an established legal
body to provide additional, related protections where they seem to be missing, in
the relative absence of any whisperings of support for the idea. It seems that in
order to propose such a measure, the least onerous proposition should be
suggested.
A monitoring regime like the Optional Protocol or the European system could
be adopted, but that might drastically narrow the appeal of the treaty, and thus, its
widespread ratification. The creation of a new committee for extrajudicial killings
seems a bit ambitious for a crime for which there is not a movement with the
impetus of the anti-torture movement. This author, though hoping not to
shortchange her idea's success were ever it to be adopted, thus would certainly not
advocate for the creation of a Committee Against Extrajudicial Killings.
As a result, if a new monitoring committee was not created for extrajudicial
killings, and this convention does not directly mirror the Committee Against
Torture, should it perhaps be monitored by the Human Rights Council, formerly
the Commission on Human Rights, which monitored most such treaties until the
Committee Against Torture decided to forge its own path? The Council already
monitors extrajudicial killings. There is currently a Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, organized under the Human
Rights Council and created through its bureaucracy rather than by treaty.90 The
Rapporteur studies informally, and currently receives a very low response rate to
its surveys according to its 2010 report. A new convention could give the
Rapporteur a more official relationship with monitoring that is non-mandatory and
informal, but prescribes certain best practices.
86. See, e.g., AMRITA MUKHERJEE, TORTURE AND THE UNITED NATIONS: CHARTER AND TREATY-
BASED MONITORING 83 (2008).
87. BOULESBAA, supra note 75, at 294.
88. MUKHERJEE, supra note 87, at 107-16.
89. Frank Ledwidge, The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT): A
Major Step Forward in the Global Prevention of Terror, 17 HELSINKI MONITOR 69, 69-70 (2006).
90. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, www.ohchr.orglEN/Issues/Execu
tions/Pages/SRExecutionslndex.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
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The determination of which model to utilize-the existing rapporteur and
voluntary compliance, or a more rigorous regime-may depend on whether the
value of monitoring compliance outweighs the benefit of widespread ratification.
The Optional Protocol was not widely ratified, and if provisions like it were
included in the main body of a convention against extrajudicial killings,
ratifications would likely be low. One suggestion is to revamp the role of the
Rapporteur with voluntary monitoring, and have a more extensive Optional
Protocol to the extrajudicial killings convention for those states that wish to
promote mandatory compliance. Such a compromise may eliminate the use of the
less effective middle option of the Committee Against Torture, ensure more
widespread compliance, and boost the norm against extrajudicial killings, while
promoting a path to growth and greater monitoring in the future.
G. Other Lessons from the CAT
The CAT contains many standard provisions that did not merit substantial
discussion above: the method of choosing and manner of meeting of the members
of the treaty's committee, and the accession and ratification provisions. Also, the
standard language regarding is significant: the investigation of the treaty's crime,
the convention as a basis for extradition to supplement existing treaties, the
training of government personnel about the requirements of the treaty, mutual legal
assistance, and victim complaint and compensation. Some of these ideas can be
adopted into a new convention against extrajudicial killings, while others may not
be necessary. For example, Article 15 of the CAT states: "Each State Party shall
ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of
torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a
person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made." As described
in this article, one prominent feature of torture is that it is often used to gather
information, and thus, this article has obvious relevance in the anti-torture regime.
Since the object of an extrajudicial killing appears to be to silence, such a
provision can most likely not be adapted from the CAT to the new convention.
Likewise, CAT at Article 10 states:
1. Each State Party shall ensure that education and information
regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the
training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical
personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the
custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any
form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.
2. Each State Party shall include this prohibition in the rules or
instructions issued in regard to the duties and functions of any such
persons.
This provision again applies more aptly in the anti-torture regime. It seems likely
that proper interrogation techniques have to be strictly trained and enforced to
ensure prevention of torture in many situations; however, law enforcement officers
more readily understand that they are not at liberty to execute civilians, and thus,
2013 209
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
such training is not needed in a similar manner. Nonetheless, the extrajudicial
killings convention should include the recommended training on the parameters of
self-defense and defense of others, and certainly should admonish law enforcement
professionals in their written materials about the severe penalties attaching to
committing such a killing. Thus, Article 10 should to be modified to meet the
needs of the new convention.
H. The Unique Legal Requirements of the Crime ofExtrajudicial Killing
An important role for the new convention, as was important for the CAT, is
the elimination of safe harbors for human rights violators. This convention targets
a relatively specific, illiberal, state-sponsored or state-complicit behavior. Its
jurisdiction will stem from the fact that states are not often effective at suppressing
their own wrongdoing, and that some crimes with a humanitarian or political
dimension are of international concern. However, while the right to life is one of
the most important human rights, the convention is not intended to supply a
number of special rules for how states should exercise capital punishment, if they
choose to have it. It is not meant to provide exhaustive rules about how to fairly
run a judicial system so that the state may take a person's life. Such measures are
important and should be considered elsewhere, such as by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Thus, there should be a limiting article in the convention that clarifies that it is
meant to address killings outside of the judicial process and those committed
outside of the law of war. However, it is perhaps also worth considering adding
language that killings which shield themselves in the judicial process in some way,
but are clearly not conducted through the judicial process, should not be protected
or at the very least are discouraged. Regulation of sham trials and hasty executions
should clearly define the limited scope of intrusion into what constitutes a fairly-
reached sentence of death.
Likewise, incidences of public safety killings should be carved out. For
example, a police officer who shoots at a person as they are committing a violent
crime or trying to escape police custody, has a duty to act in protection of public
safety. This killing should receive legal protection. Although both self-defense
and defense of others are forms of public safety killings, this should be clarified in
the text of the convention. Additionally, as with the law of armed conflict and
judicial process, there should be a provision that states that a pre-textual use of a
legitimate police power-such as the right to act in the public safety-will not
shield a potential perpetrator from liability. It must be clear that the mere fact that
a public official claims that a killing was in self-defense, or to protect others, will
not be sufficient to shield a potential perpetrator from inquiry.
Aspirational provisions can be included as to proscribe proper death penalty
sentences. For example, it could admonish states not to tolerate bribery, to provide
for fair trial and at least one appeal, and to provide counsel, among other
recommendations included in detail in Additional Protocol I article 75. It could set
the parameters of self-defense and defense of others, as well as the law of armed
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conflict. Finally, it could recommend required training for members of the
military, judiciary, or law enforcement. However, given the enormity and
diversity of thought on these issues, it is not recommended that these requirements
be imposed as mandatory.
IV. A U.S. CRIMINAL STATUTE ON EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS
To enact criminal prohibitions in the United States, a U.S. statute is required
whether the proposed convention succeeds or fails. 91 For the reasons mentioned
above, a law allowing U.S. prosecutors to target and punish those who use the
power of the state or another form of political power to kill others is desirable.
Thus, even without a convention, a statute must be drafted. If a convention is
successfully drafted, it will likely not be self-executing under U.S. law and it will
require domestic legislation is order to criminalize the activity for those who come
within U.S. jurisdiction.
The advantage to a convention is obviously its greater scope of application, as
it will hopefully span many states. Its advantage in the United States is to bolster a
statute that is written with "found-in" or "custodial universal" or "treaty-based"
jurisdiction. This is the form of jurisdiction with the greatest ability to prevent
impunity: it allows the U.S. to punish offenders coming from other regimes to the
United States. Currently, the United States prosecutes former torturers who seek
refuge in the United States once their regime is out of power, but it has limited
ability to prosecute politically motivated murders. 92 A law that allows jurisdiction
over these murders when they occur abroad will have the greatest utility-indeed,
that is the central utility. Thankfully, there are not many politically motivated
murders committed by the state or guerilla groups in the United States. The ability
to end impunity in states where the rule of law is weak relies on there being no
country to which criminals can go for a safe haven. This form of "custodial"
universal jurisdiction is the most expansive besides the disfavored "true" universal
jurisdiction, which allows crimes committed abroad to be tried in absentia with no
territorial nexus.93  "Found in" language is time-tested and reliable, frequently
used, relatively easy to litigate, and very desirable.
While it has long been established that Congress may criminalize
extraterritorial conduct even in the absence of an underlying treaty or support in
international law, this does not change the fact that Congress has been extremely
hesitant to do so. For example, there are about twenty-one crimes for which
Congress has imposed the desirable "the alleged offender is later found in/present
91. However, this does not apply in the highly unlikely circumstance that the treaty is self-
executing.
92. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(a)-(b) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2009); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A(a)-
(b) (2004).
93. STEPHEN MACEDO, ET AL., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29, 31
(2001), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/univejur.pdf
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in the United States" language.94 Nearly each of these crimes is connected to a
suppression treaty signed by the United States, with the exception of some of the
terrorist crimes, which are predicated under the passive personality bases of
jurisdiction under international law.9 5
Yet, Congress has the authority to write a law with extraterritorial application,
as long as that law complies with due process requirements. It is well-established
that Congress can regulate conduct outside the territorial boundaries of the United
States,9 6 and "the courts of the United States have repeatedly upheld the power of
Congress to attach extraterritorial effect to its penal statutes, particularly where
they are being applied to citizens of the United States . .. Generally, statutes are
not construed to have extraterritorial effect absent a clear statement from Congress.
Where Congressional intent for extraterritorial jurisdiction of a statute is clear, that
jurisdiction is not precluded by norms of customary international law.9 8 Congress
is not bound by international law, nor is U.S. law "subordinate to customary
international law."99 In fact, "[i]f it chooses to do so, [Congress] may legislate
with respect to conduct outside the United States, in excess of the limits posed by
international law."' 00 The role and duty of U.S. courts' therefore is "to enforce the
94. 18 U.S.C.A. § 32(b)(4) (2006) (destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities); 18 U.S.C.A. §
37(b)(2) (1996) (violence at international airports); 18 U.S.C.A. § I12(e) (1996) (protection of foreign
officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons); 18 U.S.C.A. § 831(c)(3) (1996)
(prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials); 18 U.S.C.A. § 878(d) (1996) (threats and
extortion against foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons); 18 U.S.C.A. §
1091(e)(2)(D) (2009) (genocide); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1116(c) (1996) (murder or manslaughter of foreign
officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(e) (2006)
(kidnapping only in the case of the kidnap of a foreign official); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1203(b)(1)(B) (1996)
(hostage taking); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1596(a)(2) (2008) (additional jurisdiction in certain trafficking offenses
for §§ 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, 1591-involving human trafficking and slavery); 18 U.S.C.A. §
1651 (1948) (piracy); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2280(b)(1)(C) (1996) (violence against maritime navigation); 18
U.S.C.A. § 2281(b)(3) (1996) (violence against maritime fixed platforms); 18 U.S.C.A. §
2332f(b)(2)(C) (2002) (bombings of places of public use, government facilities, public transportation
systems and infrastructure facilities); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(d)(1)(C) (2009) (providing material support
or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339C(b)(2)(B) (2006)
(prohibitions against the financing of terrorism); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339D(b)(3) (2004) (receiving military-
type training from a foreign terrorist organization); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A(b)(2) (2001) (torture); 18
U.S.C.A. § 2442(c)(3) (2008) (recruitment or use of child soldiers); 21 U.S.C.A. § 960a(b)(5) (2006)
(foreign terrorist organizations, terrorist persons and groups); 49 U.S.C.A. § 46502(b)(2)(C) (1996)
(aircraft piracy).
95. However, it certainly appears that Congress prefers to use custodial jurisdiction when
bolstered by a treaty as opposed to standing on that bases alone for terrorism crimes.
96. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991).
97. United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 214 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
98. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
99. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 (2d Cir. 2003).
100. United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, not to conform the law of the
land to norms of customary international law." 01
From a due process perspective, Congress can provide for jurisdiction based
on its constitutional authorities "[tIo define and punish . . . [o]ffenses against the
Law of Nations," "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," and pursuant to
the Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction with the Treaty Power.1 02 Some
statutes thus have a firm constitutional basis on the "Law of Nations" clause where
there is also universal or general jurisdiction for those crimes. When the United
States enters a treaty to establish international legal basis for extraterritorial
jurisdiction over a crime, Congress may enact legislation as necessary and proper
to effectuate U.S. obligations under the treaty.103
Generally, Congress is only comfortable providing a custodial universal basis
of jurisdiction if the crime is pursuant to an aut dedere aut judicare treaty, or, a
crime for which universal jurisdiction exists very clearly. If the Convention
Against Extrajudicial Killings comes to be, then no more argument need be had
about implementing a custodial jurisdictional trigger-neither under international
law, nor U.S. due process law. But if not, then it is drastically less likely Congress
will proscribe extrajudicial killings which occur outside its territorial, nationality,
and passive personality jurisdiction. This would not be fatal to a statute against
extrajudicial killings, as such a statute could still be written. However, a statute
that only applies to killings done in the U.S., or by or against U.S. citizens, would
have little value and would be redundant with the federal murder statutes the
United States already has enacted. As a result, this provision is of vital importance
if the United States wants to punish offenders over whom it has jurisdiction. If no
convention is drafted, Congress would either need to: abrogate its previous
position that it prefers not to legislate custodial universal jurisdiction crimes
without universality; implement an aut dedere aut judicare treaty, which could
raise due process concerns); or, rely on the fact that extrajudicial killings are
currently illegal under customary international law, and covered by universal
jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction exists for all states to proscribe certain kinds of crimes
that are so heinous and thus, of the concern of all states that they violate
"peremptory norms"-they are not acceptable for any reason in any culture.' 0"
Such crimes have been discussed, such as piracy, slavery, and perhaps terrorism.10 5
Also, it is commonly maintained that torture was already a universal jurisdiction
crime and violation of a peremptory norm before the CAT was written. CAT
101. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1091; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004)
(declining to apply alleged customary international law absent U.S. statute to effect that law).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
103. See id.
104. See Bassiouni, supra note 53, at 67.
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
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simply strengthened and outlined it.'06  The question therefore remains, is a
prohibition on extrajudicial killings already a peremptory norm?
In practice, extrajudicial killings certainly seem to be roundly condemned by
the international community. Numerous international agreements and guiding
documents condemn arbitrary deprivations of life, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 6),107 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (article 3),08 the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man (article 1),109 the American Convention on Human Rights (article 4),o10 the
European Convention on Human Rights (article 2),' and the African Charter on
Human Rights and Peoples' Rights (article 4). 112 Thus, it appears that arbitrary
deprivations of life, at least, have been roundly condemned by human rights law
internationally, regionally, and for some time.
That an extrajudicial killing is a violation of norms of international law
appears to have also received some traction in U.S. law. The Alien Tort Statute
("ATS") may criminalize such acts, and its history is informative of this
proposition. As part of the original Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS reads: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."ll 4 The object appears to have been to provide remedies for breaches of
customary international law, particularly for foreign merchants who otherwise had
no standing to sue Americans in U.S. courts.s"5 It was a largely unused statute for
nearly two hundred years,"'6 until 1980 in the case Fildrtiga v. Peila-Irala.17 In
that case, two Paraguayans sued a former police officer who tortured and killed a
relative of theirs."' 8 The Second Circuit held that Congress could give jurisdiction
for customary international law, a matter of federal concern, and that customary
international law now included a ban on torture by a government actor." 9 Notably,
106. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (1988).
107. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 6.
108. UDHR, supra note 24, art. 3.
109. Rights of Man, supra note 24, art. 1.
110. ACHR, supra note 21, art. 4.
111. ECHR, supra note 21, art. 2.
112. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982).
113. See ATCA, supra note 79.
114. Id.
115. John Haberstroh, The Alien Tort Claims Act & Doe v. Unocal: A Paquete Habana Approach
to the Rescue, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 231, 236 (2004).
116. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications ofthe Alien Tort
Statute, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 607, 609 (2004).
117. Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
118. Id. at 876.
1l9. Id. at 880.
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the court held this before the CAT was in force, looking to sources such as the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, while cautioning that not every provision
in the declaration had ripened into a robust norm of customary international law.
Yet summary executions are among the limited class of violations of customary
international law that have been found actionable under the Alien Tort Statute.120
This is an extremely important finding to import from the civil arena to the
criminal one. If U.S. courts have already found that extrajudicial killings violate
customary international law for the purposes of being vulnerable to civil suit, this
strongly suggests a basis for universal criminalization of extrajudicial killings.
About a decade after the ATS was reinvigorated with this human rights
purpose, Congress elected to expand the reach of the statute by passing the Torture
Victim Protection Act ("TVPA").121 The TVPA is appended as a statutory note to
the ATS. It was enacted in 1992 to provide a cause of action in cases of officially
sanctioned torture and extrajudicial killing.122 It states:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation-
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action,
be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any
person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death. 123
The Torture Victim Protection Act, unlike the ATS, is not a jurisdictional
statute.124 The purpose of the Act is to "work in conjunction with the [ATS],
expanding the [ATS's] reach to torts committed against United States citizens (not
just 'aliens') who, while in a foreign country, are victims of torture or 'extra-
judicial killing."'l 25 Thus, this act demonstrates something very interesting. First,
Congress wished to extend protections for human rights suits from aliens to U.S.
citizens. But, only in limited cases-those of torture and extrajudicial killings.
These areas of governmental misconduct are of particular concern. As the seminal
case Kadic v. Karaci6 noted, certain violations of the law of nations are illegal
whether they are conducted by state actors or by private actors, including: piracy,
genocide, war crimes, or participation in the slave trade.126 However, this is not
true of torture and summary execution. Those two crimes can only be violations of
120. Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute, and
Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. NT'L L. J. 1, 5 (2007).
121. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as note
to 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
122. Id.
123. Id. at § 2(a), (b).
124. Kadic v. Karad2id, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995).
125. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 319887, at 3
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
126. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
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international legal norms if public actors conduct them.127 Thus, we see that in
U.S. law there is already recognition of the shared nature of torture and
extrajudicial killings and that extrajudicial killings appear to grow naturally from,
and bear a strong relationship to, prohibitions on torture.
Nor has the United States only acknowledged ATS tort suits against singular
actors. In the case Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, plaintiffs brought suit
against Iran for sponsoring a terrorist attack against American service members
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").12 8 The FSIAl29 is the only
legal basis under which a lawsuit can be brought against a foreign sovereign in the
United States, and provides strict limitations.' 30 Under the FSIA terrorism
exception, sovereign immunity is waived when (1) a foreign state (2) committed
an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking,
or [provided] material support or resources for such an act if such act or
provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official,
employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of
his or her office, employment, or agency,
(3) which "caused" (4) "personal injury or death" (5) for which "money damages
are sought."' 3 ' Again, an extrajudicial killing is appended to a U.S. statutory list or
impermissible international crimes. This time, still lumped with torture, it is
invoked with a "terrorism" exception.132 In Murphy, the plaintiffs alleged torture
and extrajudicial killing (as well as provision of material support to terrorists), but
the attack on a Marine Corps barracks to kill its inhabitants was not found to be
custodial torture, but rather an extrajudicial killing, using the definitions of the
TVPA.133 Even in the tort realm, the need for a distinct extrajudicial killing cause
of action, rather than overreliance on showing torture occurred, is demonstrated.
Thus, it seems there is some cause to believe that the view that persons should
not be arbitrarily deprived of life by their governments has emerged as a customary
law concept. There also seems to be a great deal of recognition in U.S. statutory
and case law that extrajudicial killings violate customary international law. In civil
suits, extrajudicial killings are prohibited alongside crimes based on peremptory
norms, for which universal jurisdiction exists.134  These U.S. statutes and cases
127. Id. at 243.
128. Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 2010).
129. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602-1611 (2006).
130. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38-39 (D.D.C. 2009).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006).
132. Indeed, until 2008, under 28 U.S.C. § 1605, states lacked immunity for any one of these
crimes even when not occurring in the context of state sponsored terrorism. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, PL 110-81, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3 (2008) (providing for a lack of
jurisdictional immunity in certain cases in which money damages were sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage
taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act).
133. Murphy, 740 F. Supp. at 70-71.
134. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, supra note 121, § 2(a), (b).
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strongly suggest that the U.S. has acknowledged the growth of international law to
define this specific crime. The existence of the Special Rapporteur in the area also
shows its recognized coalescence in the international arena. While it seems it
could successfully be argued that the crime exists and is sufficiently defined in
international law, it may still be in an early stage of recognition. A convention
against extrajudicial killings might serve to flesh out the concept, and make it a
peremptory norm for once and for all, as the CAT appears to have helped to do for
the crime of torture. Without that service, it may be difficult to definitively say
extrajudicial killings are covered by universal jurisdiction and proscribe the crime
in the United States. Nonetheless, this paper strongly argues that the norm has
emerged specifically enough for Congress to proscribe extrajudicial killings
without a treaty on a universality basis.
If no consensus or impetus for a convention can be reached, and Congress
decides to nonetheless move forward and enact a statute proscribing extrajudicial
killings, the United States will be writing a statute with a clean slate. Writing such
a statute without the basis of an aut dedere aut judicare treaty may lessen some
support for found-in jurisdiction, though as previously observed, the courts have
held that Congress nevertheless has the capacity to write such a law. Universality
should nonetheless be proficient for due process and prudentially concerns.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2340A is the U.S. statute that effectuates our obligation
under the CAT to criminalize acts of torture:
(a) Offense-Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to
commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned
for any term of years or for life.
(b) Jurisdiction-There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in
subsection (a) if-
(1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States; or
(2) the alleged offender is present in the United States,
irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.
(c) Conspiracy-A person who conspires to commit an offense under
this section shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty
of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of
which was the object of the conspiracy.
Following the logic given above that the CAT pattern is being used to limit
controversy and run a well-worn path to punish a very related crime, it makes
sense to model the statute criminalizing extrajudicial killings by using similar
language and penalties. Even if the convention were not to be written, signed, or
ratified, the following statute could still be used as a pattern. The author proposes
the following statute criminalizing extrajudicial killing:
Chapter 113C of the U.S. Code should be renamed from "Torture" to
"Torture and Extrajudicial Killings." 18 U.S.C. § 2340D should be
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added after 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340A-C (the statute above, criminalizing
torture, and its supplementary provisions), and titled "Extrajudicial
killing":
(a) Offense-Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to
commit an extrajudicial killing shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, and if death results
to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be
punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(b) Jurisdiction-There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in
subsection (a) if-
(1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States; or
(2) the alleged offender is present in the United States,
irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.
(c) Conspiracy-A person who conspires to commit an offense under
this section shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty
of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of
which was the object of the conspiracy.
Similarly, this provision identifies that the United States will likely decline to
use territorial jurisdiction for the statute. While the U.S. position is certainly not
that torture is acceptable when it occurs inside the United States, there appears to
be great fear by American lawmakers that torture allegations will be used
incorrectly against law enforcement. That concern is not great enough in the eyes
of this author to have merited extraterritorial-only jurisdiction. It should be
removed from the crime of torture, and certainly should not be added to the crime
of extrajudicial killings.
This provision varies from language matching the U.S. statute criminalizing
torture by increasing the penalty to life for attempts of murder to death where the
killing occurs. For example, 18 U.S.C. § I11, the general federal murder statute,
provides that any person who commits first degree murder is subject to the death
penalty, and any person who commits second degree murder, being of a less
premeditated style, faces a maximum punishment of life imprisonment. The
federal attempted murder statute provides that attempted murder cannot be
punished by more than twenty years.135 These prohibitions also echo the torture
statute that carries a maximum punishment of twenty years, or the death penalty if
death results from the act. It seems the extrajudicial killing statute could easily
mimic both. However, the humble suggestion of this paper is that an extrajudicial
killing is a more severe crime than murder in the ordinary course because of the
betrayal by a public official, and more severe than torture because it is intended to
end the life of the person permanently. Thus, the formulation of the crime
recommended by this paper proposes a maximum of lifetime imprisonment for
attempt. Since extrajudicial killings are intended to cause a more significant
135. 18 U.S.C.§ 1113 (2006).
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harm-the death of the victim-a life punishment, as with other intentional
homicide crimes in the U.S. code where death does not result-particularly 18
U.S.C. § 956, conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals abroad-is appropriate.136
Many may debate the appropriateness of a death sentence as the death
sentence is increasingly unpopular worldwide, is increasingly scrutinized as a
whole by the highest court in the United States, and the federal death penalty has
been rarely recently used. Nonetheless, this punishment is in keeping with the
severity of punishment for similar crimes in the U.S. Code, and particularly, the
Supreme Court of the United States has always preserved the use of death penalty
for a successful, intentional homicide under U.S. law.' 37
The actual act of an extrajudicial killing must be carefully written, as was the
torture statute. In keeping with the plan to model the extrajudicial killings statute
on the torture statute, and house them together in the same portion of the United
States Code, the two definitions could appear together:
In 18 U.S.C. § 2340, "Definitions" paragraph (3) defining the term
"United States" should be renumbered to paragraph (4), and inserting a
new paragraph (3) defining extrajudicial killing:
As used in this chapter-
(1) "torture" means an act committed by a person acting under the color
of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical control;
(2) "severe mental pain or suffering" means the prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from-
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind-altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration
or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality;
(3) "extrajudicial killing" means an act committed by a person acting
under color of law, or under the direction or control of a non-state
136. 18 U.S.C. §§ 956(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (2006).
137. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,410 (2008) (striking down the death penalty for
rape of a child while explicitly stating that the court was not striking it down for a number of other
offenses).
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political group which exercises de facto control over the territory or
population in a territory in which the crime occurred, specifically
intended to end the life of another person, when that act is not incident
to lawful sanction, public necessity, self-defense or the defense of
others, or the law of armed conflict;
(4) "United States" means the several States of the United States, the
District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and
possessions of the United States.
The definition of extrajudicial killing, unlike the current statutory definition
of torture, includes our earlier observation that protections against extrajudicial
killing should be expanded when the victims are also harmed by political groups
with de facto political control over a territory or a population to which the victim
belongs.138 The definition also includes our observations that the proscription of
extrajudicial killing includes some elusive considerations, such as the fact that law
enforcement, military, and other government officials are sometimes rightfully
permitted to intentionally take the life of a person on behalf of the state.
Importantly, the form of the proposed statute does not change depending on
whether there is a source convention or not. These features are legal and prudent
under domestic law either way, per the earlier conclusion about universality for the
emergent crime of extrajudicial killings.
This proposed statute is only the criminal statute for the crime of extrajudicial
killing. Many issues taken up in the larger Convention Against Torture include
considerations of civil liability and evidentiary constraints. Immigration law
issues, civil law issues, procedural and evidentiary legal issues are all significant
issues that are not discussed here, but should be carefully considered whether a
treaty is negotiated or it is undertaken to suppress extrajudicial killings as a nation.
One prosecutorial and practical issue related to this formulation is that it tries
to be expansive, and carve out those governmental killings that are permissible,
leaving the rest that are not criminalized. This approach is intended to avoid the
fate of the Convention Against Enforced Disappearances, which proscribes only
one technique and does not cover all kinds, or even many kinds, of illiberal
governmental abductions, kidnappings, and detentions. It would seem in reading
the text that each of these proper purposes must be proved not to have occurred,
which is difficult for a prosecutor. Yet in reality, other kinds of crimes deal with
this same problem by having the carve outs be considered affirmative defenses,
provable by the defendant if they apply.'39 For example, the federal murder statute
proscribes "unlawful killing" leaving the defenses of public authority or self-
138. In fact, in reforming the statute, drafters should consider expanding the potential violator in
torture as well, to cover these non-state actors. Although this paper is not so presumptuous as to do it
here, there seems no reason not to have symmetry between them in the code.
139. United States v. Santos-Rivera, 183 F.3d 367, 370-71 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting the well-
established rule of criminal statutory construction that an exception set forth in a distinct clause or
provision should be construed as an affirmative defense and not as essential element of crime).
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defense to be alleged by the defendant.1 40 Likewise, considering the carve outs to
extrajudicial killings as affirmative defenses is an acceptable compromise to give
defendants fair notice of what is illegal while defining a crime in such a way as is
practical and useful to prosecutors.
Similarly, it may be questioned why the definition of extrajudicial killing
advocated by this paper is not directly lifted from the definition that already exists
in the TVPA. The TVPA, in defining extrajudicial killings and torture alongside
each other, provides:
(a) EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING-For the purposes of this Act, the
term "extrajudicial killing" means a deliberated killing not authorized
by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not
include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried
out under the authority of a foreign nation.
(b) TORTURE-For the purposes of this Act-
(1) the term "torture" means any act, directed against an
individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by
which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering
arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that
individual or a third person information or a confession,
punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from-
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or
the administration or application of mind altering
140. See 18 U.S.C.§ 1111(a) (2006).
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substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality.141
The first consideration to remember is that the TVPA is civil and therefore its
purpose is different. A criminal statute needs to be careful on elements, careful to
give notice, and must properly consider the prosecutorial burden of evidence.
Defining a similar phenomenon differently for different purposes is not new in the
U.S. Code. For example, there are more than one dozen definitions of terrorism in
the U.S. code for various criminal, tortious, immigration, and other purposes.142
Looking to a comparison between the criminal torture statute, § 2340A, and
the definition of torture in the TVPA, they appear to be similar. But there are some
differences. The criminal statute makes clear that only "severe" mental pain and
suffering is enough to trigger prosecution. The criminal statute also omits
references to the exact purpose of the torture, hoping to broadly capture torture
crimes. Importantly, the civil definition of torture omits the element of an official
actor, although the requirement that the offender be acting under "color of law" in
order for the claim to be actionable is elsewhere in the TVPA.143
The civil extrajudicial killing definition captures a broader range of behavior
than the criminal statute may want to do. Based on the definition, the statute
places great emphasis on the requirement that the killing be authorized by
standards that are sufficiently civilized. It may not be desirable to try to litigate
cases criminally in which poorly functioning legal regimes gave death sentences
that did not meet international standards. The real specter is killings not that fall
short on due process, but that are clearly committed with an illiberal purpose.
While tackling both may be desirable, it is questionable whether raising judicial
standards in other countries is a suitable goal to pursue through the criminal law as
opposed to civil suit. This paper discussed whether sham processes and pre-textual
hearings should be prosecuted with this new crime of extrajudicial killings; that
question reappears in this context. However, if the criminal law is kept out of that
trickier area, then much of this statute falls away. The TVPA definition of
extrajudicial killing includes the catchall of what a state has authority to do under
international law. This is a fine caveat and not one that this article is opposed to
per se; it observes the same concern about wanting to define the crime broadly and
list the caveats instead.
Yet this caveat, sufficient for a civil statute, may simply not give criminal
defendants sufficient notice of what conduct is permissible. As a result, the
criminal statute could face void for vagueness challenges. It also might be difficult
to show prosecutors what to prove. By creating a list of more specific caveats, the
criminal statute is less broad and flexible to changes in international law and new,
unconsidered things, but more useful to prosecutors and fair to defendants.
141. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, supra note 121, § 3(b)(2)(A)-(D).
142. See Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of
Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIs. 249, 249-50 (2004).
143. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, supra note 121, § 2(a)(1).
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V. CONCLUSION
This article does not oppose taking more time to consider the complex issues
raised by the criminalization of extrajudicial killings. It does not oppose the
international community or lawmakers in the United States from taking time to
flush out the concept of what an extrajudicial killing is, and criminalizing it in a
way that does not rely on the philosophies and mechanisms that underlie the
Convention Against Torture. But it seems that the CAT, prized as it is for its
strong stance against illiberal states that violate human rights, omits a rather
serious practice that is relatively common the world over, and quite intimately
related to torture. Oppressive states, regimes, and de facto powers do not always
torture their victims and release them, leaving them as witnesses. Often, they kill
them outright, or torture and kill them-leaving very little evidence of the one
crime that could potentially be prosecuted. It seems strange that greater cruelty
could remove a human rights violator from international concern and therefore
from our jurisdiction. Even though torture is conceptually simpler and more
cohesive, more must be done to end impunity for human rights violators.
There is nothing wrong with taking more time to consider the nature of what
it is for the state, a state official, or a political organization to kill an individual-
and to determine which actions are legitimate and which are not. This article has
specifically sought to the limit the concept of what an extrajudicial killing is to
exclude killings that are governed by the law of armed conflict, executions that
pass through the judicial organs of the state, and killings that occur for public
safety reasons. Although the first and last should be dealt with by the discreet
bodies of law that govern them, the second concept, procedural fairness, is not so
easily dismissed. Many of the illiberal executions that occur in the transitional or
corrupted societies of the world do pass through some amount of judicial process
that clearly does not meet an even minimum standard of procedural fairness and
due process. Many of these murders are politically motivated. But, political
motivation should not be a factor. If there is a place in the world where officers of
the state have impunity to execute people for nonpolitical reasons, that impunity
should not continue.
This essay tries to address politically motivated murders that are essentially
the common completion of the act or torture, and fill what might be perceived to be
a rather large gap in our enforcement of criminal sanctions on torture. Yet, more
discussion is warranted. A treaty of the kind suggested here could successfully co-
opt the well-worn path of the Convention Against Torture, both its international
treaty and its statute as written in U.S. domestic law, to move non-controversially
to legislating against this emergent international crime. Hopefully by doing so, the
international community, or even the United States alone, can begin ending
impunity for illegitimate, state-sanctioned, and political murders.
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